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Abstract Criminal offenders are sometimes required, by the institutions of
criminal justice, to undergo medical interventions intended to promote rehabilita-
tion. Ethical debate regarding this practice has largely proceeded on the assumption
that medical interventions may only permissibly be administered to criminal
offenders with their consent. In this article I challenge this assumption by sug-
gesting that committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of
medical intervention. I then consider whether it is possible to respond persuasively
to this challenge by invoking the right to bodily integrity. I argue that it is not.
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Criminal offenders are sometimes required to undergo medical interventions
intended to facilitate their rehabilitation.1 For example, drug-addicted offenders
may in some jurisdictions be required to take medications that replace their drug of
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1 I take rehabilitation to consist in the improvement of the offender’s character, where ‘improvement’ can
be understood narrowly, so as to imply only that the post-rehabilitation offender will be less likely to
offend, or more broadly, so as to imply that the post-rehabilitation offender will be a morally better
person.
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addiction and thus remove one potential impediment to rehabilitation.2 Similarly,
sex offenders are sometimes required to receive injections of testosterone-lowering
drugs. These are intended to suppress their sex drive and thus diminish their
motivation to sexually offend, or to enhance the effectiveness of psychological
rehabilitation programmes.3
The use of medical interventions for such rehabilitative purposes has, to date,
been limited. However, we might expect it to become more prevalent in the future,
since the range of medical interventions capable of facilitating rehabilitation is
likely to expand. Behavioural and social neuroscience are currently thriving areas of
research and are beginning to uncover neural correlates of dispositions towards
aggression, impulsiveness, diminished empathic ability and psychopathy. They are
also already suggesting means of influencing these dispositions in ways that might
be thought conducive to rehabilitation in some offenders. For example, some widely
used antidepressants have recently shown promise in reducing aggression, while the
drug divalproex has been found to reduce impulsiveness in adolescents with
explosive temper (Bond 2005; Nevels et al. 2010; Donovan 2000; Khanzode et al.
2006).
Given developments such as these, it seems possible that, in the future, we will
have available a significant range of medical interventions capable of aiding
rehabilitation. It is unsurprising, then, that there is a burgeoning debate on the
question whether and when it might be permissible for the state to require that
criminal offenders undergo such interventions (Rosati 1994; Bomann-Larsen 2013;
Ryberg 2012; Ryberg and Petersen 2013; Vincent 2014; Shaw 2014; Bublitz and
Merkel 2014; Douglas et al. 2013; McMillan 2013).
1 Preliminaries
The aim of this article is to begin to challenge an assumption that has underpinned
much of this debate. Before introducing this assumption, however, I need to define
the scope of the discussion by distinguishing some different ways in which medical
interventions may be imposed on criminal offenders. Three distinctions will be
helpful.
The first concerns the legal context within which requirements to undergo
medical interventions are imposed. We can distinguish here between cases in which
the requirement to undergo the intervention is imposed with the backing of medical
law, for example, mental health or public health legislation, and cases in which it is
imposed under the provisions of the criminal law, where this is interpreted broadly
2 For example, in the United Kingdom, methadone treatments have been imposed as part of Drug
Treatment and Testing Orders imposed by the courts. See, for discussion, Eley et al. (2002) and Hough
et al. (2003).
3 Other pharmaceuticals have also been used for this purpose. For example, selective serotonin re-uptake
inhibitors, a widely used class of anti-depressants, have been used to prevent recidivism as they have, as a
common side-effect, the reduction of libido. Historically, physical destruction of the testes (known as
physical or surgical castration) was also widely used to prevent sexual recidivism. See, for a discussion of
medical interventions used to prevent sexual recidivism, Thibaut et al. (2010).
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so as to include, for example, laws and regulations regarding criminal sentencing
and parole.
The second distinction concerns the relevance of the offender’s history. In some
cases, the imposition of these interventions is triggered solely by forward-looking
considerations such as the offender’s future risk to others; it is not linked in any way
to past criminal offending, except insofar as this constitutes evidence for future risk.
In other cases, however, medical interventions are imposed in part in direct response
to the commission of a crime. That is to say, the mere fact that the offender has
committed a crime triggers—or is one of a number of considerations that jointly
trigger—the imposition of the medical intervention. This article, focuses on medical
interventions that are imposed on criminal offenders, for the purpose of facilitating
rehabilitation, (1) under the provisions of the criminal law, and (2) in direct response
to the commission of a particular crime. I will refer to medical interventions used in
these ways as medical correctives.4
A third distinction has played an important role in ethical debate regarding the
permissibility of imposing medical correctives. It concerns the avoidability of the
requirement to undergo the corrective. When medical correctives have been used to
date, they have frequently been imposed as a condition of parole or early release.
Thus, the offender can escape the requirement by electing to remain in prison. He is
effectively presented with a choice between receiving the medical corrective, and
enduring further incarceration. In other cases, however, the requirement to undergo
the medical intervention is unavoidable. The medical corrective may, for example,
be included as a compulsory element of a criminal sentence.
Most scholarly debate has focussed on the imposition of medical correctives as a
condition of parole or early release, which has been seen as the less controversial
approach. However, even this practice has been heavily criticised, most often on the
ground that, when the only alternative is to remain incarcerated, an offender’s choice
to receive a medical corrective is coerced, and this renders his consent to it invalid. For
instance, Kari Vanderzyl argues that the practice of offering sex offenders the choice
between undergoing testosterone-lowering interventions—either chemical or surgical
castration—as an alternative to incarceration is ‘inherently coercive’:
the doctrine of informed consent requires a knowledgeable and voluntary
decision to undergo treatment, yet offering a convicted offender castration as
an alternative to a lengthy prison sentence constitutes an inherently coercive
practice rendering truly voluntary consent impossible. Thus, castration should
be rejected as a condition of probation (Vanderzyl 1994–1995: 140).
Similarly, in relation to the chemical or surgical castration of convicted rapists,
William Green maintains that
4 I will not distinguish between cases in which the medical corrective, though used primarily to achieve a
rehabilitative goal, also achieves (or is intended to achieve) some orthodox therapeutic purpose such as
the treatment of a disease, and cases where it does not. I believe that the arguments that I will offer apply
equally to both cases. Additionally, I will not have anything to say about the use of medical interventions
to achieve other forensic goals such as deterrence, retribution or incapacitation. I believe that the
arguments that I discuss in this paper would bear also on such practices, but I allow that these practices
may be susceptible to objections that I do not consider here.
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Voluntary consent depends upon a person’s ability to make a choice freely
The convicted rapist is faced with two options—a lengthy prison sentence or
even death on the one hand and Depo-Provera [a form of chemical castration]
or surgical castration on the other—and cannot be said to have the capacity to
act freely in making a choice. Freedom of choice is impossible because the
convict’s loss of liberty constitutes a deprivation of such a magnitude that he
cannot choose freely and voluntarily, but he is forced to give consent to an
alternative he would not otherwise have chosen. In such circumstances men
are willing to ‘‘barter their bodies.’’… As a consequence, the convicted rapist
cannot give voluntary consent to an offer of probation which contains a
surgical castration or Depo-Provera condition (Green 1986, 16–17).
The dominant response to these claims has been to argue that, though offenders offered
a choice between undergoing medical correctives and further incarceration clearly
face pressure to consent to castration, that pressure does not render their consent
invalid, for example, because it does not amount to coercion, or does not undermine
autonomy (e.g., Rosati 1994; Ryberg 2012; Ryberg and Petersen 2013; Wertheimer
and Miller 2013). Proponents of this response have typically accepted, at least
implicitly, an assumption made by those to whom they are responding, namely:
The Consent Requirement: Medical correctives can only permissibly be
provided with the valid consent of the offender who will undergo the
intervention.
In this article, I wish to challenge this assumption and thus lay open an alternative
line of response. I do not attempt to conclusively refute the Consent Requirement.
But I do seek to show that it is more difficult to defend than might initially be
thought, and than has, I believe, widely been assumed by both opponents and
proponents of the use of medical correctives. I attempt to do this by first outlining a
problem faced by the proponent of the Consent Requirement, and then arguing that
what I take to be the most obvious response to this problem—an appeal to the right
to bodily integrity—runs into difficulties of its own.
Throughout I assume, to keep things manageable, that all medical correctives
consist in the injection of a drug—that is, a biologically active, non-food substance.
I thus limit the scope of the Consent Requirement so that it applies only to medical
correctives of this kind. I suspect that many defenders of the Consent Requirement
would be prepared to extend it to cover less invasive medical interventions, such as
the oral administration of drugs, but I do not assume that they would do so here.
Similarly, it should not be assumed that, in challenging the Consent Requirement, I
am defending the view that more invasive interventions—such as major surgical
procedures—could permissibly be imposed without consent.
2 The Problem of Moral Liability
The scope of the Consent Requirement is, then, limited such that it covers only
medical interventions that consist in the injection of a drug. As I formulated it
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above, it is also limited in another way. It covers only medical correctives: medical
interventions that are provided as part of the criminal justice system’s response to
the commission of crime, and for the purposes of facilitating rehabilitation.
However, the Consent Requirement, thus understood, could be regarded as an
extension of a comparable requirement regarding the use of medical interventions
for conventional therapeutic purposes within ordinary clinical contexts. It is now
generally taken as beyond dispute that such therapeutic medical interventions
should not, except in certain special circumstances, be provided to a competent
adult patient without consent, and it is natural to think that a parallel claim would
hold with respect to medical correctives.
There is, however, a potential difficulty with extending this requirement for
consent from orthodox therapeutic medical interventions to medical correctives: it is
widely thought that the state may permissibly do things to criminal offenders
without their consent that it could not permissibly do to others without (and in some
cases even with) consent. Thus, for example, it would ordinarily be grossly wrong to
incarcerate someone without consent, but in the context of criminal justice,
nonconsensual incarceration is widely thought to be permissible. Nonconsensual
incarceration may be hard to justify given prevailing prison conditions, which often
involve exposing incarcerated individuals to overcrowded conditions, a high risk of
rape and assault, and serious health threats (Stern 2001; Human Rights Watch 2001;
Wolff et al. 2007; Wolff and Shi 2009). But we can imagine other, less harsh
arrangements that would nevertheless deserve the name ‘‘incarceration’’. Suppose
that offenders could be held in institutions that placed serious and constant
constraints on free movement and association, but otherwise exposed offenders to
no greater risks to their health and security than average members of the
unincarcerated citizenry, and took all reasonable steps to safeguard opportunities for
political participation, legal representation and education. It would be widely
(though not universally) accepted that the state could permissibly impose conditions
of this sort—henceforth, ‘minimal incarceration’—on at least some criminal
offenders.
Plausibly, in committing certain crimes, an offender becomes morally liable to
the imposition of minimal incarceration, and for a substantial period. (In what
follows, I will simply assume that this is so.) This raises the question whether they
might also become liable to the imposition of some varieties of medical
intervention. Indeed, given the rather drastic effect of criminal offending on the
range of interventions to which one is liable—these interventions plausibly also
include psychological rehabilitation programmes, fines, community service, proba-
tion regimes, and the freezing of financial assets—it might seem that a proponent of
the Consent Requirement owes us an explanation as to why medical interventions
are not among the interventions to which we become liable. We might ask: what sets
medical intervention apart from minimal incarceration and the other kinds of
intervention to which criminal offenders become liable? Why is it that, following
offending, consent is required for the imposition of medical correctives, but not for
these more traditional kinds of criminal remedy?
In what follows, I will focus on the comparison between medical correctives, on
the one hand, and minimal incarceration, on the other. I will consider whether and
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how one could justify the Consent Requirement, which rules out the nonconsen-
sual imposition of medical correctives, while rejecting any comparable constraint
on the nonconsensual imposition of minimal incarceration.
There are several differences between medical correctives and minimal
incarceration to which one might plausibly appeal here. One possibility would be
to point to differences in the purposes for which incarceration and medical
correctives would be imposed. Medical correctives are, we are assuming, employed
in order to aid the offender’s rehabilitation. By contrast, incarceration, it might be
argued, is intended to mete out deserved suffering, to communicate social
disapproval, or to deter third parties from offending. Thus, one might argue that
consent is required for medical correctives, but not for minimal incarceration, on the
grounds that the goals of incarceration are different to, and perhaps morally more
urgent than, the goals served by medical correctives. Perhaps it is permissible to
nonconsensually treat offenders in intrusive ways in order to realise retributive,
communicative or deterrent goals, but not in order to realise rehabilitative ones.
However, rehabilitation—the goal for which medical correctives are imposed—
has commonly also been regarded as a goal, and in some cases, the only goal, of
incarceration.5 Moreover, two other goals sometimes attributed to incarceration—
incapacitation and deterrence—are commonly thought to serve the same higher
objective as rehabilitation: namely, the prevention of crime or, more generally, the
maintenance of security. Thus, it seems worth considering what would follow for
the Consent Requirement if the goal of rehabilitation—or whatever higher goal
rehabilitation serves—were sufficiently important that it could justify the noncon-
sensual imposition of minimal incarceration. In such a case, one might wonder how
the same goal could fail to justify the nonconsensual imposition of at least some
medical correctives.
In what follows I will thus consider whether it is possible to defend the Consent
Requirement even on the assumption that the ultimate goal for which medical
correctives are imposed is sufficiently important that it could justify nonconsensual
minimal incarceration. I examine only what I take to be the most obvious defence of
this kind—and the defence which I suspect the authors quoted above would invoke
if pressed. This defence appeals to a right to bodily integrity.
3 The Right to Bodily Integrity
If we possess any moral rights at all, it is plausible that a right to bodily integrity is
among them. This I take to be a right that protects against intentional interference
with one’s body, or certain kinds of such interference. An important feature of this
right is that it protects against the relevant kinds of bodily interference regardless of
what consequences that interference might contingently have, and regardless of
what motives might contingently have motivated it. It is a right against bodily
interference as such. Suppose, for example, that Smith pins down Jones and severs
5 For a classic statement of the view that rehabilitation is the sole goal of incarceration, see de Beaumont
and de Tocqueville (1833, 17–18).
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his hand despite Jones’ strident and reasonable protests. Whether Smith does this in
order to save Jones’ life (say, because Jones’ hand is gangrenous) or in order to
achieve vengeance as part of a family feud is irrelevant to the question whether
Smith violates Jones’ right to bodily integrity, though it may be relevant to the
question whether he justifiably does so. Similarly, whether severing Jones’ hand will
in fact save his life, and whether it can be expected to do so make no difference to
whether Smith violates Jones’ right to bodily integrity. The right to bodily integrity
is insensitive to such differences.
It is plausible that the right to bodily integrity typically rules out the
nonconsensual imposition of medical interventions, at least, medical interventions
which are, like the injection of drugs, physically invasive. Certainly, appealing to a
right to bodily integrity is a standard way of defending the requirement that medical
interventions, when used therapeutically within the context of clinical medicine,
should be used only with the consent of the patient.6 It might seem, furthermore,
that the right to bodily integrity will rule out the nonconsensual imposition not only
of orthodox therapeutic medical interventions, but also of medical correctives. After
all, imposing a medical intervention as a medical corrective constitutes bodily
interference of the same kind as does imposing a medical intervention for
therapeutic purposes, and though the motives and perhaps consequences associated
with this interference will differ between clinical and forensic contexts, the right to
bodily integrity is, as we have just seen, insensitive to such differences. On the other
hand, it seems doubtful whether the right to bodily integrity could be invoked
against the nonconsensual incarceration of criminal offenders, for incarceration does
not obviously involve bodily interference: it involves the placement of barriers
external to the body. Thus, an appeal to a right to bodily integrity seems a prima
facie promising way of defending the Consent Requirement without committing
oneself to the impermissibility of nonconsensual incarceration.
It is, however, possible to challenge this defence. An initial difficulty is that the
sorts of considerations which support the existence of a right to bodily integrity
might also be thought to support the existence of rights to free movement and free
association, and these rights might seem to create trouble for the view that
nonconsensual incarceration is permissible. For example, one reason to suppose that
there is a right to bodily integrity is that nonconsensual interference with the bodies
of innocent persons seems, to many, to be seriously wrong in most cases, even
where it seems that it could be justified on utilitarian grounds. A right to bodily
integrity could account for this wrongness, and this, arguably, lends credence to the
view that there is such a right. But similar considerations could be invoked in
support of a right to free movement and association, for nonconsensually
constraining an innocent person’s freedom of movement and association—for
6 Perhaps the most commonly heard defence of a consent requirement within clinical medicine appeals
not to a right to bodily integrity, but to a right to autonomy. But we clearly do not enjoy a right to
autonomy over all aspects of our life. For example, I do not enjoy a right to autonomously control the
behaviour of others around me. I take it that when one appeals to a right to bodily autonomy to defend a
consent requirement in medicine, one is appealing to a right to autonomously control what forms of
bodily interference one is subject to. And this, I take it, is parasitic on a more basic right to bodily
integrity which rules out (most cases of) nonconsensual bodily interference.
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example, through incarceration—also seems to many to be seriously wrong in most
cases, even where it might seem justifiable on utilitarian grounds. For example,
knowingly imprisoning an innocent person is abhorrent to most, even where it
would successfully deter many grave crimes.
A second reason to suppose that there might be a right to bodily integrity is that
the existence of such a right might seem to be entailed by the existence of a more
basic right to self-determination. It might seem that, given the crucial dependence of
the self on the body, interfering with the body involves interfering with self-
determination. Again, however, similar considerations would support the existence
of rights to free movement and association, since severely constricting a person’s
freedom of movement and association just as plausibly involves interfering with that
person’s self-determination.
Parallels such as these cast doubt on the possibility that one could consistently
posit a right to bodily integrity without also positing a right to free movement and
association. Moreover, even if one could consistently do this, it seems unlikely that
many would want to adopt this combination of views: most rights theorists who
endorse a right to bodily integrity would also endorse rights to free movement and
association, and the existence of these latter rights appears, at least at first sight, to
be in tension with the view that incarceration can be permissible. Thus, the appeal to
bodily integrity, as specified thus far, does not clearly allow one to deny the
permissibility of nonconsensual medical correctives while endorsing nonconsensual
minimal incarceration.
At this point it might be argued that the existence of rights to free movement and
association can, in fact, be reconciled with the permissibility of incarceration.
Indeed, I have already alluded to one way in which such a reconciliation might be
achieved. I noted earlier that criminal offending can make one liable to certain
forms of treatment that would otherwise be impermissible, including incarceration.
One way in which criminal offending may do this is by causing one’s rights to free
movement and association lose some of their normal protective force following
criminal offending.7
There are various ways of accounting for this loss of protective force. One
explanation would hold that, in offending, one simply waives one’s rights to free
movement and association. Another would hold that one activates an exception
clause already built into those rights. Yet another would maintain that, in
offending, one confers on others a right to restrict one’s movement and
association, and this right must then be balanced against one’s persisting rights
against such restrictions. But however we account for the change, it seems that
there is a change: if people normally possess rights to free movement and
association, yet the incarceration of criminal offenders can be justified, then
criminal offending must cause the rights to free movement and association to lose
their normal protective force.
7 Similar points could also be made regarding external property rights and rights to control of one’s own
time and labour. It might seem that, if criminal offending can make one liable to fines, probation regimens
or community service, it must cause these rights to lose some of their normal protective force, for these
rights would rule out the imposition of such interventions on non-offenders.
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At this point, however, a further difficulty arises: if criminal offending causes
rights to free movement and association to lose some of their protective force, we
might well wonder whether it has a similar effect on rights to bodily integrity.
Perhaps offending causes one’s right to bodily integrity to lose some of its
protective force, making it the case that certain nonconsensual medical interventions
are no longer impermissible. Thus, even if we grant that the right to bodily integrity
normally rules out nonconsensual medical intervention, it might fail to rule out the
nonconsensual imposition of medical interventions as medical correctives. The
appeal to bodily integrity thus faces a more specific version of the problem of moral
liability discussed in Sect. 2.
However, once the right to bodily integrity is on the table, it becomes easier to
see how one might respond to this problem. One might invoke the prima facie
plausible view that the right to bodily integrity is more robust than rights to freedom
of movement and association.8 The rough idea here is that it takes a greater
deviation from normal circumstances for the right to bodily integrity to lose its
protective force than for the rights to freedom of movement and association to lose
their protective force; it takes more to render oneself liable to impositions on bodily
integrity than to render oneself liable to impositions on free movement and
association.9 If this is correct, then, even though committing a crime makes one
liable to the restrictions on free movement entailed by incarceration, it may not
make one liable to impositions on bodily integrity of the sort entailed by
compulsory medical remedies. The right to bodily integrity may remain in place,
and retain its normal protective force.
In what follows, I consider whether this response succeeds. I consider, that is,
whether the right to bodily integrity is indeed more robust, in the relevant sense,
than rights to free movement and association. However, first, I need to sharpen the
response by specifying the relevant rights, and the relevant dimensions of
robustness, more fully.
4 The Robustness Claim
The right to bodily integrity is most naturally thought of as a general right that
protects against a wide range of different kinds of treatment. For example, it may
protect its bearer against many different kinds of nonconsensual bodily interference
ranging from relatively innocent forms of physical contact to major surgical
procedures and extreme forms of physical violence. However, it is possible to think
of this general right as being composed of more specific rights against specific kinds
of bodily interference. Moreover, it is plausible to think that these more specific
rights might differ in their robustness. We might expect that we possess a more
robust right to bodily integrity in respect of extreme physical violence than in
8 I assume that rights to free movement and free association are the only rights that protect against the
imposition of minimal incarceration.
9 I assume, for simplicity, that loss of protective force is a binary matter. A more sophisticated account of
the robustness of rights could allow that the protective force offered by a right varies as a matter of
degree.
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respect of, say, non-sexual touching. This is why it takes more to become liable to
extreme physical violence than to become liable to non-sexual touching.
Similar thoughts apply to rights to free movement and association. These are
most naturally thought of as general rights that protect against a wide variety of
restrictions on movement and association. However, we can think of these general
rights as being composed of more specific rights against particular kinds of
restriction, and we might think that these more specific rights will differ from one
another in their robustness.
The proponent of the line of argument that I wish to consider here is, as I will
understand her, interested in comparing the robustness of one specific right to bodily
integrity with that of one specific right to free movement and association. On the one
hand, she is interested in the right to bodily integrity that protects against the
injection of a drug (henceforth simply ‘injection’).10 On the other hand, she is
interested in the specific rights to free movement and association that protect against
the kinds of constraints on movement and association involved in minimal
incarceration. Our imagined interlocutor maintains that the specific rights to bodily
integrity that protect against injection are more robust than the specific rights to free
movement and association that protect against the kinds of restrictions entailed by
minimal incarceration.
She maintains, moreover, that these rights are more robust on one dimension in
particular: they are more robust in the face of criminal offending. There are various
kinds of deviation from normal circumstances that may cause a right to lose its
protective force, and these correspond to different dimensions of robustness. Our
interlocutor is interested in one kind of deviation, namely, the commission of a
crime by the rightholder. She asks ‘how serious must an individual’s criminal
offending be before her rights to bodily integrity, free movement and free
association lose their protective force?’ And she answers that it takes more serious
criminal offending for the right to bodily integrity to lose its protective force than
for the other two rights to lose theirs. Indeed, if she wishes to argue that the right to
bodily integrity always rules out the nonconsensual imposition of medical
correctives, she will need to maintain that however serious one’s criminal
offending, one’s right to bodily integrity retains its protective force. But I will
not attribute this view to her here. I attribute to her only
The Robustness Claim: It takes more serious criminal offending for the rights
to bodily integrity that protect against injection to lose their protective force
than for the rights to free movement and association that protect against
minimal incarceration to lose theirs.
Except where otherwise specified, I henceforth take ‘robustness’ to mean
‘robustness in the face of criminal offending’ and I use the phrases ‘rights to
bodily integrity’ and ‘rights to free movement and association’ to refer to the
specific rights mentioned in the Robustness Claim. This allows me to paraphrase
that claim simply as:




Rights to bodily integrity are more robust than rights to free movement and
association.
The Robustness Claim gains some initial credibility from the observation that
committing a crime does not render one liable to all impositions of the sort that
would otherwise plausibly violate one’s rights. For example, it does not, I would
say, make one liable to killing, torture or public humiliation. We plausibly possess
some rights that are more robust than rights to free movement and association such
that they would retain their protective force even if we committed serious crimes.
Thus, the proponent of the Robustness Claim need not argue that rights to bodily
integrity are exceptional in any way. She need only argue that they are, in respect of
their robustness, more like rights against torture, killing and public humiliation than
they are like rights to free movement and association.
Nevertheless, I think it is doubtful whether an appeal to the robustness of the
right to bodily integrity can succeed in ruling out the possibility that criminal
offending makes one liable to the imposition of medical interventions. Though there
are plausibly some rights that are more robust in the face of criminal offending than
rights to freedom of movement and association, it is, I think, difficult to see why we
should place the right to bodily integrity among them. To buttress this point, I now
turn to consider two strategies via which one might attempt to establish the
Robustness Claim. I argue that each faces serious difficulties.
5 Appeals to Intuition
An initial strategy would be to appeal to case-based intuitions. The simplest version
of this strategy would appeal to intuitions about cases involving criminal offending.
If we could identify cases in which, intuitively, it would be permissible to subject an
offender to minimal incarceration, but not to an injection, we would arguably have
some intuitive support for the view that rights to bodily integrity are more robust
than rights to free movement and association. This approach faces two problems,
however. First, it lacks dialectic force against the advocate of medical correctives.
Such an advocate is, I take it, unlikely to share the relevant intuitions. Second, it
appeals to intuitions whose evidential status is uncertain. Insofar as we find the
imposition of minimal incarceration more acceptable than the imposition of an
injection in such cases, this may simply reflect our much greater familiarity with
incarceration than medical interventions within the realm of criminal justice. But if
our intuitions in this area are driven by differences in familiarity, then they will have
no evidential value in respect of the moral questions of interest to us here.
There are, however, other cases to which one might appeal in order to provide
less direct intuitive support for the Robustness Claim. I noted above that there might
be other factors, besides criminal offending, that can cause rights to bodily integrity,
free movement and free association to lose their protective force. If one could show
that, intuitively, rights to bodily integrity are more robust in the face of these other
factors than rights to free movement and association, this might provide indirect
support for the view that they will also be more robust in the face of criminal
offending, for it might support the view that they are generally more robust. Thus,
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for example, it is plausible that both rights to bodily integrity and rights to free
movement and association can lose their protective force in the face of potential
catastrophes: it may be permissible to interfere with someone’s body, or to constrain
his movement and association, if this is necessary to avert a catastrophe. But
suppose it could be shown that, intuitively, it takes a much more serious potential
catastrophe to justify bodily interference than to justify restrictions on movement
and association. We would then have some reason to believe that rights to bodily
integrity are more robust in the face of potential catastrophes than rights to free
movement and association, and insofar as this supports the view that the former
rights are quite generally more robust than the latter, this will indirectly support the
view that they are more robust in the face of criminal offending as well.
The difficulty with this more indirect approach, however, is that, when we look to
cases in which criminal offending plays no role, it is difficult to find clear intuitive
support for the view that rights to bodily integrity are more robust than rights to free
movement and association. There are, admittedly, some cases regarding which some
might have intuitions supportive of the Robustness Claim. Consider the following
pair of cases:
Jill is infected with a novel strain of the Ebola virus, which could, if it spread,
infect and kill many people. The only way to stop it spreading is to keep her in
quarantine for three months, and, since Jill does not agree to this, the
quarantine would have to be imposed against her will.
Jane is infected with a novel strain of the Ebola virus which could, if it
spreads, kill many people. The only way to stop the virus spreading is to inject
Jane with a drug. This drug will not cure Jane’s infection, but it will prevent
the virus from infecting others. Jane does not agree to receive the injection, so
it will need to be imposed against her will.
Here we are considering imposing constraints on Jill’s movement that are similar to
those involved in minimal incarceration. We are also considering interfering with
Jane’s body through the imposition of an injection.
It might perhaps seem plausible that, if the threat to the public health is great,
both of these interventions could be permissible, especially if the negative side-
effects thereby inflicted on Jill and Jane would be modest. However, some might
intuitively judge that our threshold for imposing the safe injection should be higher
than our threshold for imposing the period of quarantine, holding fixed all
unspecified factors (such as the severity of the side-effects of the two interventions).
They might judge, that is, that a greater public health threat would be required to
justify the injection than to justify the period of quarantine. This might seem to
support the view that rights to bodily integrity are more robust than rights to free
movement and association in the face of pandemic threats.
My own intuitions about these cases run in the opposite direction. It seems to me
that, other things being equal, the threshold for imposing the period of quarantine
should be at least as high as the threshold for imposing the safe injection. However,
I will not attempt to make anything of this intuitive response here. Instead, I will
settle for the (I hope rather uncontroversial) claim that it is not intuitively clear that
the threshold for intervention should be higher in the case of Jane than in the case of
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Jill. If this is correct, then any intuitive support for the Robustness Claim provided
by this case will be weak.
Similar thoughts apply to cases, outside of the context of criminal justice, where
competent individuals pose a threat to themselves or to others as a result of a severe
mental disorder. Many jurisdictions allow such individuals to be subject either to
forced commitment to a psychiatric institution (a restraint that is comparable to
incarceration with respect to freedom of movement and association) or to forced
treatment (which frequently involves bodily interference of the same sort as, we are
supposing, is involved in the imposition of a medical corrective). In these cases, as
in cases of pandemic control, the fact that an individual poses a threat to others
appears to cause her rights to bodily integrity, free movement and free association,
to lose their normal protective force. But again, it is, I think, not intuitively clear
that a greater threat to others should be required in order to impose forced
psychiatric treatment (without containment) than to impose containment without
treatment. Indeed, interestingly, the laws in many jurisdictions adopt the same
threshold for treatment as for containment.
It may, of course, be possible to find cases in which rights to bodily integrity do
seem, intuitively, to be clearly more robust, on some dimension, than rights to free
movement and association; that I find it difficult to imagine such cases does not
show that they do not exist. However, the difficulty identifying such cases at least
casts doubt on the suggestion that the Robustness Claim can be defended by an
appeal to intuitions about such cases.
6 Theoretical Considerations
At this point, the proponent of the Robustness Claim might turn to an alternative
strategy. I noted above that there seem to be some rights, such as rights against
killing, torture and public humiliation, that clearly are more robust in the face of
criminal offending than rights to free movement and association. Many would hold
that, however serious or frequent one’s criminal offending, these rights never lose
their protective force. Perhaps one could argue that the considerations which explain
why these rights are highly robust, and more robust than rights to free movement
and association, apply also to rights to bodily integrity.
6.1 Harm
One consideration that many would appeal to in seeking to explain the great
robustness of these rights is the fact that they protect against forms of treatment
that typically cause very serious harm, more serious harm than constraints on free
movement and association of the sort involved in minimal incarceration.
Certainly, it is plausible that killing is typically more harmful than restricting
someone’s freedom of movement and association. However, it is difficult to see
how this consideration could be invoked to show that rights to bodily integrity are
more robust than rights to free movement and association. The restrictions on
movement and association entailed by incarceration—even minimal
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incarceration—would reliably cause (and may themselves constitute) significant
harms. They would frequently damage existing personal relationships while
making it difficult to form new ones, they would seriously restrict sexual
freedoms, they would make it impossible to pursue most careers, and they would
more generally prevent the realisation of many life-plans. Moreover, even in cases
where minimal incarceration did not, by chance, seriously frustrate life plans or
relationships, we might expect it to cause significant distress. After all, imposing
more extreme forms of confinement and social isolation is an established cause of
severe distress and has frequently been used as a punishment or torture technique
for precisely this reason.11
All things considered, then, constraints on free movement and association of the
sort involved in minimal incarceration are likely to be severely harmful in most
cases. It is, I think, difficult to see why we should expect that the imposition of an
injection would normally inflict more harm. Many drugs have only relatively minor
negative side-effects. It might be argued that much of the harm typically caused by
nonconsensual bodily interference stems not from the biologically mediated effects
of the interference, but consists rather in the way in which the act of interference is
experienced by the victim. Most people attach great symbolic value to their bodies
and experience nonconsensual interference with their bodies as highly intrusive and
often disrespectful.12 As a result bodily interference can inflict a great deal of harm
even when its biologically mediated effects are relatively minor. This is perhaps
clearest in cases of rape. Nir Eyal asks us to imagine a case in which a rapist carries
out a rape in such a way that it causes no physical pain and there is no risk of
pregnancy (or, let us add, infectious disease) for the victim. As Eyal notes, we
would of course condemn such a rape. Moreover, we are likely to do so at least
partly on the ground that, notwithstanding the lack of biologically mediated adverse
effects, it is likely inflict great harm. It is likely to be experienced as intrusive,
degrading and humiliating, and for these reasons among others, to inflict great
psychological pain.13
As cases of rape demonstrate, bodily interference can, even if medically safe, be
seriously harmful because of the way the interference is experienced (as I will say, it
can cause substantial experiential harm). However, there is scope to question
whether bodily interference of the sort we are interested in here would typically be
11 It is not clear precisely how much distress such constraints could be expected to cause in the absence
of negative effects on life projects or relationships. It is reported that existing incarceration practices
frequently cause significant distress in inmates. See, for example, Haney (2003). However, this distress
could be due to the actual damage to relationships and life projects caused by incarceration, or to features
of prevailing incarceration conditions that are distinct from the restrictions on movement and association
that it entails— for example, it might be due to the perceived risk of being mistreated by guards or other
inmates.
12 See, for development of this point and its significance for the morality of bodily interference, Eyal
2009.
13 A less subjective version of this argument would maintain that interference with the body is itself
harmful even leaving aside the psychological distress it causes. The psychological pain that such
interferences cause is not the primary harm, but is rather due to our perceiving a more objective harm. I
do not separately consider this argument, but I believe that the arguments that I offer below in respect of
its more subjective variant apply equally to it.
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more harmful than minimal incarceration for this reason. After all, not all forms of
nonconsensual bodily interference are experienced in ways that cause great pain.
For example, absent a sexual context or uneven power relationship, forms of
touching such as a hand on the shoulder are typically not experienced as highly
distressing, at least, not in many cultures. Rape is arguably unusual among forms of
bodily interference in the degree of experiential harm it causes.
The relevant question here is whether the nonconsensual injection of a drug is
likely to be experienced in such a way as to cause substantial psychological pain—
substantial enough to make it more harmful, all things considered, than restrictions
on free movement and association of the sort involved in minimal incarceration. I
am not aware of any social scientific evidence that would allow us to answer this
question with confidence. However, there is, I think, some reason to doubt that
nonconsensual injection is typically experienced so negatively. Very large numbers
of people are already subjected to injections that are either compulsory, or at the
very least costly to avoid. I am thinking here of children, young adolescents and
healthcare workers who are required, or strongly encouraged, by their parents or
employers to participate in routine vaccination programmes. If such widespread
practices were typically experienced in seriously negative ways—negative enough
that they are more harmful, all things considered, than minimal incarceration—it
would be rather surprising that this has not been noticed and has not become the
subject of extensive research and public debate.14 (Contrast, for example, the
voluminous literature on the way in which coerced or unwanted sexual encounters
are experienced.) This would be particularly surprising given that the medical
consequences of vaccination programmes have been widely studied and debated, so
it is not simply the case that vaccination programmes have been introduced without
thought being given to their possible harmful effects.
6.2 Threats to Agency
A second consideration that may justify the great robustness of rights such as those
against killing, torture and public humiliation has a more Kantian flavour. It might
be argued these rights are highly robust because they protect against forms of
treatment that constitute, in some sense, an attack on the victim’s agency. Killing,
torture and public humiliation are all forms of treatment that, many would argue,
threaten agency in a way that constraining someone’s free movement and
association does not.
We can distinguish two different ways in which they may constitute a threat to
agency. First, when A kills, tortures or publicly humiliates B, this may express a
14 It is possible, of course, that young people and healthcare workers are not representative of the wider
population in the way that they experience compulsory or costly-to-avoid safe injections. It may be that
people generally experience the imposition of safe injections very negatively, though young people and
healthcare workers do not. It is also possible that the lack of research on and public debate about the way
in which such interventions are experienced reflects a failure to notice or appropriately respond to the way
in which they are experienced, rather than a correct assumption that they are not experienced in seriously
harmful ways. For these reasons, the absence of research and debate on this matter constitutes only weak
evidence fro the view that compulsory (or costly to avoid) injections do not typically cause substantial
experiential harms.
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denial of, or at least disregard for, B’s agency. It may express the proposition that
B is not an agent, or at least, that A does not care whether B is an agent or not. Let us
call this type of threat a communicative threat to agency. Second, when A kills,
tortures or publicly humiliates B, this may constitute an attack on B’s agency in the
more straightforward sense that it will, or can be expected to, interfere with or
diminish B’s agency, or sense of agency. Call this a causal threat to agency.15
It seems somewhat plausible that rights against killing, torture and public
humiliation are so robust because killing, torture and public humiliation all involve,
or at least typically involve, serious communicative or causal threats to agency. And
it might be thought that rights to bodily integrity are highly robust—and more robust
than rights to free movement and association—for the same reasons.
For this suggestion to be plausible, however, there will need to be some reason to
think that interfering with someone’s body by injecting a drug (typically) consti-
tutes a more grave threat to agency than does constraining his freedom of movement
and association in the way entailed by minimal incarceration. Given the distinction
between communicative and causal threats to agency introduced above, we can
distinguish two different grounds for regarding bodily interference to be a more
serious threat to agency than restriction of movement and association. It could be
more serious in that it involves a more severe reduction in the victim’s agency or
sense of agency. Or it could be more serious in that it expresses a more
thoroughgoing denial of or disregard for the victim’s agency.
It is difficult to see why it need be a more serious threat to agency in either of
these respects. Arguably, nonconsensual interference with another’s body invariably
expresses some degree of disregard for the other’s agency, for it involves ignoring
the preferences of that individual, and we might take those preferences to express
his agency. But the same can be said for nonconsensual restrictions on free
movement and association; these also involve ignoring the preferences of the person
whose freedom of movement and association is restricted.
Bodily interference may also express a more thoroughgoing disregard for the
agency of another. If one injects someone with a drug because one believes he is no
different from a dangerous animal and should be treated as such, one clearly
expresses a serious disregard for his agency. But this is because one’s action is
motivated by a set of beliefs and desires which presuppose that the other is not an
agent, or ought to be treated as though he is not an agent. Interference with another’s
free movement could also be motivated by such desires and beliefs; after all,
restriction of movement is also the kind of intervention to which we might subject a
dangerous animal. And were we to restrict movement for those reasons, it would, I
think, constitute a comparably serious communicative threat to agency. It is,
15 To say that that an intervention is a causal threat to agency is, perhaps, to say that it risks inflicting a
certain kind of harm (the harm of having one’s agency undermined). Nevertheless, an attempt to explain
the robustness of a right by maintaining that it protects against serious causal threats to agency is
interestingly distinct from the attempt to explain it by maintaining that the right protects against seriously
harmful forms of interference. If it is ultimately the (typical) harmfulness of an intervention that
determines the robustness of the right we enjoy against it, then we would enjoy a more robust right
against an intervention that is all-things-considered more harmful, though a less serious casual threat to




moreover, difficult to see any reason why interference with bodily integrity would
be any more likely to be driven by such motives than restrictions on free movement,
so it would be difficult even to argue that bodily interference typically involves a
more serious communicative threat than restrictions on free movement and
association.
Similar thoughts apply to causal threats to agency. Bodily interference could
interfere with agency, for example, by inducing depression or extreme alienation
from one’s self. But so too could constraints on free movement and association, and
I see no reason to suppose that bodily interference would invariably or more
probably produce such effects than restrictions on free movement and association.
Agency resides in the mind, and the mind is, of course, dependent on and influenced
by the body in various ways. Thus, there is certainly a risk that anything that
interferes with our bodies will also interfere with our agency. But constraints on free
movement and association can also interfere with our agency. They do so most
obviously by removing various options (possible actions) that we might otherwise
have chosen to take. An incarcerated individual may still have full agency, where
that is understood as a mental capacity, but he cannot fully exercise that capacity
because so many possible actions are closed off.
It might be argued that merely removing external options is less threatening to
agency than interfering with the mind—and thus with the very capacity for agency.
Interference with the mind might be thought a particularly severe threat to agency
because of the way in which it interferes with agency at its roots. But here it should
be noted that constraints on free movement can also interfere with the mind, and
thus, potentially, with the very capacity for agency. After all, the mind is in various
respects dependent on, and influenced by, our immediate natural and social
environment, which in turn is affected by restrictions on free movement and
association. (An incarcerated individual occupies a very different social and natural
environment than a free person.) According to the extended mind thesis and some of
its close relatives, some parts of our environment are in fact part of our minds, or at
least, are on a par with brain states in serving as part of the physical basis for our
minds.16 On these views, constraints on free movement and association directly
influence the mind. But even one who rejects such views must surely accept that
changes in one’s local environment can exert a direct causal effect on the mind, and
that, in some cases, these effects might include conditions that impede agency—
perhaps depression, hallucinations or paranoia. There is, for example, some
evidence that solitary confinement and other forms of social or sensory deprivation
can cause hallucinations and other perceptual disturbances.17
A final attempt to establish that bodily interference involves a more serious
causal threat to agency than the restriction of free movement and association would
appeal to the means via which these two interventions can impede agency. One
might maintain that, even if constraints on free movement were to cause agency-
16 See, for the classic statement of the extended mind thesis, Clark and Chalmers (1998). For a discussion
of some of it’s implications for the ethics of brain-influencing biomedical interventions, see Levy (2007).
17 See for a review, Haney (2003). Note, however, that these findings have been contested. For some
contrasting results, see O’Keefe et al. (2010).
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impeding mental conditions such as depression or paranoia, there is still a sense in
which they would be less threatening to agency than bodily interventions with
similar affects. For it might be thought that, when environmental manipulations
such as constraints on movement and association cause such conditions, they cause
them only through engaging agential processes. The inmate subjected to solitary
confinement only becomes depressed, or paranoid, as a result of reflecting on his
situation. By contrast, when one interferes with the body of another, one may
threaten his agency through purely brute causal mechanisms—for example, by
biologically influencing the neural states on which the mind supervenes. Thus,
bodily changes might perhaps be said to causally threaten agency both in their
means of operation and their results, whereas environmental interventions threaten
agency only in their results. And perhaps this difference justifies the claim that
bodily interference constitutes a more serious causal threat to agency than do
restrictions on free movement and association.
However, the distinction between agential and brute causal means does not map
as neatly on to the distinction between bodily interference and constraints on
movement and association as the above story suggests. Constraints on free
movement and association can also affect the mind—and thus potentially threaten
agency—through channels other than the engagement of agential processes. For
example, it may be that the lack of diversity in physical and natural stimuli caused
by incarceration has, through subconscious, nonagential mechanisms, an affect on
brain structure, and thus on mental processing.18 Such effects would plausibly be as
threatening to agency as the biological effects of drugs.
7 Conclusions
The Robustness Claim maintains that the right to bodily integrity which protects
against injections is more robust than the rights to free movement and association
that protect against constraints on free movement and association of the sort
involved in minimal incarceration. I have considered the possibility that we might
defend this claim by appealing to case-based intuitions. But this strategy seemed
unpromising. I noted that intuitions regarding the use of medical interventions
within the context of criminal justice have little dialectic force, and may also have
little evidential value, and once we moved away from the context of criminal
justice, I was unable to identify any clear intuitive support for the Robustness Claim.
I also considered the possibility that one might defend the Robustness Claim by
showing that safe injections would (typically) (1) harm the victim of the
interference more seriously than incarceration, or (2) constitute a more serious
18 It is not clear, for example, that the sensory disturbances and hallucinations which have been attributed
to solitary confinement can plausibly be attributed to agential mechanisms. There is also evidence that
social isolation can have significant neurological effects in non-human mammals, in which the effects
could not plausibly be attributed to agential mechanisms. This is suggestive that human brains might also
by influenced by social isolation through nonagential mechanisms. See, for example, Heidbreder et al.
(2000); Weiss et al. (2004); and Wongwitdecha and Marsden (1996).
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communicative or causal threat to agency. But I was unable to establish either
result.
I do not claim to have refuted the Robustness Claim. There are no doubt many
possible means of defending it that I have not considered, and that I am therefore not
in a position to reject. Still, I believe that I have assessed the attempts to defend the
robustness claim that are, at first sight, most promising. I thus hope that my
arguments are sufficient to cast serious doubt on the Robustness Claim, and thus on
the attempt to defend the Consent Requirement by appealing to a right to bodily
integrity. These are doubts that have not yet been acknowledged in the debate about
correctional medical interventions, where the Consent Requirement has simply been
taken for granted.
How might a defender of the Consent Requirement respond to the challenge I
have raised? One way to respond would be to seek to find an alternative way of
showing that rights to bodily integrity are more robust than rights to free movement
and association. Another possibility would be to seek to defend a finer grained
right—for example, a right not to have one’s body interfered with for certain
reasons. Perhaps, even if we have no highly robust right against bodily interference,
we have a highly robust right against certain kinds of bodily interference—
say, those that are motivated in certain ways. Yet another possible response—and
the response that I believe to be most promising—would be to appeal not to a right
to bodily integrity, but to a right to mental integrity, that is, a right against mental
interference. In Sect. 6.2 above I argued that medical correctives need not, in virtue
of the kind of bodily interference that they involve—namely, the injection of a
drug—constitute a more serious causal threat to agency than minimal incarceration.
I noted that injections need not, and often do not, have agency-undermining mental
effects. However, medical correctives are not simply generic instances of the
broader category of injections. One of the distinctive features of medical
correctives—and something that sets them apart, for example, from medical forms
of pandemic control—is that they are intended to have mental effects. They are
intended to facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation. Their nonconsensual imposition
might thus be thought to constitute a kind of nonconsensual mental interference.
Moreover, it seems possible that we enjoy highly robust rights against such mental
interference. After all, intentionally and nonconsensually altering someone’s mind
might plausibly be thought to constitute a serious threat to agency.
These are thoughts that I cannot pursue in detail here. But I wish to suggest that it
is not at all clear, in advance of detailed analysis, that an appeal to a right to mental
integrity will succeed in buttressing the Consent Requirement. In contrast to the
right to bodily integrity, the putative right to mental integrity enjoys no significant
philosophical pedigree. Very little work has been done to determine whether there is
such a right and, if so, what varieties of mental influence fall within its scope.19 (It
seems very doubtful that there is any very general right against mental influence, for
there are all sorts of ways in which we routinely influence the minds of others
without, intuitively, violating their rights.) Much philosophical work would need to
be done before we would be in a position to determine whether people generally
19 For an initial exploration of the right to mental integrity, see Bublitz & Merkel (2014).
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enjoy a right against the kind of mental interference involved in the imposition of
medical correctives, let alone a right sufficiently robust to retain its protective force
following criminal offending.
Until this work has been done, it seems to me highly uncertain whether the
Consent Requirement can be defended by reference to a right to mental integrity.
Given this, and the problems I have raised for the attempt to defend the Consent
Requirement by appealing to the right to bodily integrity, I believe that we should at
least take seriously the possibility that the Consent Requirement is incorrect; that
medical correctives could, at least in some cases, permissibly be provided without
valid consent.
This would have at least two important implications. First, it would provide us
with a second means of undermining the dominant objection to the use of medical
correctives as an optional alternative to (further) incarceration. As we saw earlier,
that objection maintains that offering a medical corrective in such circumstances is
coercive, and this makes it impossible for the offender to validly consent to the
corrective. The main response to this objection has been to maintain that, in fact,
valid consent can be obtained in such circumstances. But I have suggested that, even
if this response fails, there is a second line of defence; one could deny that valid
consent is required in order to provide a medical corrective.
Second, a failure of the Consent Requirement could have significant implications
for the question whether the state may sometimes permissibly impose medical
correctives compulsorily—that is, without giving the offender the option of refusing
the intervention and remaining in prison. If the Consent Requirement is incorrect,
then compulsory uses of medical correctives could in principle be justified. They
would not be ruled out merely in virtue of their nonconsensual nature. However, it
may not follow that the compulsory imposition of medical correctives is in fact
justified. For there might be other moral reasons to prefer an approach in which
medical correctives are offered as an optional alternative to (further) incarceration.
Or it may be that, although consent is not generally required for medical correctives,
it is required in some contexts—for example, where it can be obtained at little cost.
Thus, though the argument presented in this paper raises the possibility that the
compulsory imposition of medical correctives might be justified, it does not of itself
establish as much.
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